Scottish Independence Polling in 2025: Why Support Has Stalled Despite Brexit

The Scottish independence debate was supposed to be settled in 2014. It wasn't. Brexit was supposed to surge Yes support past 50%. It didn't. The SNP's dominance was supposed to be unshakeable. It isn't. As we move through 2025, Scottish politics is stuck in a holding pattern—independence polling frozen around 45-48%, the SNP weakened but still dominant, and a public increasingly exhausted by constitutional debate but unable to escape it.

The polling picture: stuck in the mid-40s

Since the 2021 Holyrood elections, independence polling has been remarkably stable. According to What Scotland Thinks, which aggregates all major polls, Yes support has fluctuated between 45% and 48%, with No between 52% and 55%. This is almost identical to the 2014 referendum result (45% Yes, 55% No) and represents a slight decline from the brief 50-54% Yes leads seen in summer 2020 during the pandemic.

The SNP's central argument—that Brexit fundamentally changed the case for independence—has not translated into sustained polling gains. While Scotland voted 62% Remain in 2016, and while being "dragged out of the EU against our will" remains a powerful rhetorical point, it has not been enough to shift the 5-10% of voters needed to reach a pro-independence majority.

Why? Because the economic questions that dominated 2014 have not gone away. If anything, Brexit has made them more acute. Voters who opposed leaving the EU because of economic disruption and trade barriers are not necessarily convinced that leaving the UK—Scotland's largest trading partner by far—is the solution.

The currency question still matters

In 2014, the Yes campaign's inability to provide a clear answer on currency was widely seen as a critical weakness. Would Scotland keep the pound? Create a new currency? Join the euro? The ambiguity allowed opponents to paint independence as economically reckless.

In 2025, the question remains unresolved. The SNP's official position, adopted in 2019, is that Scotland would initially keep the pound informally (without a currency union), then transition to a new Scottish currency "when conditions are right." This is more detailed than 2014, but it raises as many questions as it answers.

What would "when conditions are right" mean in practice? How long would the transition take? What would happen to mortgages, pensions, and savings denominated in sterling? Would there be capital flight during the transition? These are not abstract concerns—they are the questions that undecided voters ask, and the Yes campaign still does not have compelling answers.

Polling consistently shows that currency is one of the top concerns for soft-No voters. A 2024 Ipsos MORI poll found that 62% of Scots were "concerned" about what currency an independent Scotland would use, including 34% of Yes voters. Until this is resolved, it will remain a barrier.

The deficit problem

Scotland's fiscal position is the other major economic obstacle. According to the UK Government's GERS (Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland) figures for 2023-24, Scotland's notional fiscal deficit was approximately £18 billion, or 8.4% of GDP. This is significantly higher than the UK average of around 4-5%.

The SNP disputes GERS methodology and argues that independence would allow Scotland to make different economic choices that would improve the fiscal position. This is theoretically true, but it requires answering difficult questions: which taxes would rise, which spending would be cut, or what new revenue sources would be found?

The UK Government's position is that Scotland benefits from fiscal transfers—higher per capita spending funded by pooling resources across the UK. The SNP's position is that independence would unlock economic growth that would close the deficit over time. Both cannot be fully true.

For undecided voters, the risk is clear: independence might require austerity, tax rises, or both, at least in the short to medium term. The Yes campaign's failure to acknowledge this trade-off, or to make a positive case for why it would be worth it, remains a strategic weakness.

Generational divide: the long game

If there is a source of hope for the independence movement, it is demographics. Younger voters are significantly more pro-independence than older voters, and this gap has been consistent for years.

Polling shows that voters aged 16-34 support independence by approximately 55-60%, while those aged 55+ oppose it by similar margins. The middle-aged cohort (35-54) is more evenly split, leaning slightly towards No.

This suggests that, over time, generational replacement could shift the overall balance towards Yes. As older, more unionist voters are replaced by younger, more pro-independence voters, the baseline level of support should rise.

However, this is not inevitable. Voting preferences can change with age—people do not necessarily carry their youthful politics unchanged into middle and old age. Economic circumstances, family responsibilities, and homeownership can all shift perspectives. The assumption that today's pro-independence young voters will remain so in 20 years is just that—an assumption.

Moreover, younger voters have lower turnout. In 2014, turnout among 16-17 year olds (who were allowed to vote for the first time) was lower than among older age groups. If the independence movement cannot convert youthful enthusiasm into actual votes, the demographic advantage is theoretical.

The SNP's troubles

The SNP's dominance of Scottish politics has been the foundation of the independence movement's strength. For over a decade, the party has won every major election in Scotland, often by large margins, and has used this to argue for a democratic mandate for a second referendum.

But the SNP is no longer the disciplined, competent machine it was under Alex Salmond and early Nicola Sturgeon. The past two years have seen financial scandals (including a police investigation into party finances), leadership chaos (three leaders in two years), and policy failures in areas like education, health, and ferries.

Nicola Sturgeon's resignation in 2023, followed by the brief and chaotic leadership of Humza Yousaf, damaged the party's reputation for competence. The current leader, John Swinney, is seen as a safe pair of hands but lacks the charisma and political skill of Sturgeon at her peak.

More damaging still, the SNP's record in government is increasingly scrutinised. Education standards have declined, NHS waiting times have worsened, and high-profile infrastructure projects (notably the ferries for the Western Isles) have become symbols of incompetence. When the party's pitch is "we can run Scotland better than Westminster," failures in devolved areas undermine the entire case.

Scottish Labour's recovery

The other major shift in Scottish politics is the recovery of Scottish Labour under Anas Sarwar. After being reduced to a single MP in 2015 and written off as a spent force, Labour has clawed back support, particularly in the central belt.

Polling suggests Labour could win 25-30 seats in Scotland at the next general election, up from just one in 2019. This would not make them the largest party (the SNP would still win 15-20), but it would represent a significant recovery and would deprive the SNP of the "Scotland vs Westminster" narrative that has been so effective.

Sarwar has positioned Labour as pro-devolution but anti-independence, focusing on bread-and-butter issues like the NHS, education, and cost of living rather than constitutional politics. This appeals to voters who are tired of the independence debate and want their government to focus on public services.

If Labour wins the next UK general election, as polls suggest, and if a Labour government is seen as more sympathetic to Scotland than the Conservatives, it could further undermine the case for independence. The SNP's argument has always been stronger when there is a Conservative government in Westminster that Scotland did not vote for.

Constitutional fatigue is real

Perhaps the most underappreciated factor in Scottish politics is simple exhaustion. The independence debate has dominated for over a decade. There was the 2014 referendum, the 2016 Brexit vote, the 2017 and 2019 general elections fought on constitutional lines, the 2021 Holyrood election presented as a "de facto referendum," and constant talk of indyref2.

Polling shows that around 40% of Scots, including some Yes voters, want to "move on" from the constitutional question and focus on other issues. This does not mean they have changed their minds about independence—it means they are tired of talking about it.

This fatigue benefits the status quo. In the absence of a clear catalyst or a surge in Yes support, the UK Government can simply refuse to grant a Section 30 order (the legal mechanism for a referendum), and there is little the SNP can do about it. The Supreme Court ruled in 2022 that Holyrood cannot hold a referendum without Westminster consent.

The SNP has talked about using the next general election as a "de facto referendum," but this is legally and politically dubious. Elections are not referendums, and voters do not treat them as such. A party can win a majority of seats without winning a majority of votes, and vice versa. The idea that a general election could settle the independence question is not credible.

What would it take to shift the dial?

So what could change? Several scenarios might shift opinion:

Economic divergence. If an independent Ireland continues to outperform the UK economically, it could serve as a proof of concept for small independent nations. Conversely, if the UK economy significantly outperforms Scotland's, it would strengthen the unionist case.

Political events. A UK government perceived as particularly hostile to Scotland, or a major policy imposed against Scottish wishes (e.g., significant cuts to the Barnett formula), could galvanise support for independence.

Generational replacement. Over time, if younger pro-independence voters replace older unionist voters, the baseline could shift. But this is a slow process, measured in decades, not years.

SNP renewal. If the SNP can resolve its internal problems, return to competent government, and make a more compelling economic case for independence, support could rise. But this requires a level of discipline and strategic clarity that has been absent recently.

Labour in power. Paradoxically, a Labour UK government might either kill or revive the independence movement. If Labour governs well and is seen as responsive to Scotland, it could undermine the case for independence. If Labour disappoints, it could prove the SNP's argument that Westminster cannot deliver for Scotland regardless of who is in power.

The bottom line

Scottish independence is not dead, but it is not inevitable either. Support has been stuck in the mid-40s for years, and the economic and currency questions that dogged the 2014 campaign remain unresolved. The SNP is weaker than it was, Scottish Labour is recovering, and a significant portion of the public is simply tired of constitutional politics.

For independence to happen, Yes needs to win over 5-10% of the electorate—people who are currently unconvinced by the economic case, worried about division, or simply want to focus on other issues. That is possible, but it requires a better campaign, better answers, and probably a significant external shock.

In the meantime, Scotland remains divided, the debate remains unresolved, and the polling remains stuck. The 2014 referendum was supposed to settle the question for a generation. It settled nothing. And until one side can build a sustained majority, that is unlikely to change.