HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales: Britain's £6.2 Billion Carrier Gamble

The Royal Navy operates two 65,000-tonne aircraft carriers—HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales—the largest and most powerful warships ever built for Britain. The carriers cost £6.2 billion to build and £500 million per year to operate and maintain. They are designed to project British power globally, operating far from home with a strike group of destroyers, frigates, submarines, and support ships. On paper, they are formidable: each can carry up to 40 aircraft (F-35B stealth fighters and helicopters), sail at 25 knots, and deploy for months at a time. In practice, the carriers face severe challenges: the Royal Navy has only 48 F-35Bs for both carriers (enough for one carrier air group with no reserves), manning shortages mean only one carrier can be operational at a time, and HMS Prince of Wales has suffered repeated mechanical failures, spending more time in dock than at sea. Critics argue the carriers are too large and expensive for the UK's needs, absorbing resources that could fund more frigates, submarines, or aircraft. Supporters counter that carriers are essential for global power projection and deterrence. The debate reflects a fundamental question: what kind of navy does Britain need, and can it afford the one it has built?

The Carriers: Design and Capabilities

The Queen Elizabeth-class carriers are the largest warships ever built for the Royal Navy, dwarfing the previous Invincible-class carriers (20,000 tonnes) that were retired in 2014. Key specifications:

• Displacement: 65,000 tonnes (full load)
• Length: 280 metres (920 feet)
• Beam: 73 metres (240 feet) at the flight deck
• Propulsion: Conventional (diesel and gas turbines), not nuclear
• Speed: 25 knots (29 mph)
• Range: 10,000 nautical miles at 15 knots
• Crew: 679 ship's company, plus 915 air wing personnel (1,600 total)
• Aircraft: Up to 40 (typically 24 F-35B fighters and 14 helicopters)

The carriers use a ski-jump ramp and short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) design, which allows F-35B fighters to take off in a short distance and land vertically. This is simpler and cheaper than the catapult and arrestor wire (CATOBAR) system used by US and French carriers, but limits the carriers to the F-35B variant (the F-35C carrier variant, which has longer range and can carry more weapons, requires catapults and cannot operate from UK carriers).

HMS Queen Elizabeth

HMS Queen Elizabeth was commissioned in December 2017 and declared operational in December 2020. She has completed:

• Westlant 19 (2019): Trials with F-35Bs off the US East Coast
• Westlant 20 (2020): Further trials and certification
• CSG21 (2021): Seven-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific, visiting 40 countries and conducting exercises with the US, Japan, South Korea, and India
• Steadfast Defender 24 (2024): NATO exercise in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea

HMS Queen Elizabeth has proven reliable, with no major mechanical failures. She is currently the Royal Navy's primary operational carrier.

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Prince of Wales was commissioned in December 2019 but has suffered repeated mechanical problems:

• August 2020: Flooded during sea trials (a pipe burst, flooding machinery spaces)
• December 2020: Propeller shaft seal failure, requiring dry dock repairs
• August 2022: Propeller shaft failure shortly after leaving Portsmouth for a deployment to the US. The ship limped back to port and spent six months in dry dock for repairs costing £20 million
• 2023-24: Extended refit to fix propulsion issues and upgrade systems

HMS Prince of Wales has spent more time in dock than at sea since commissioning, raising questions about build quality and reliability. The repeated failures have been embarrassing for the Royal Navy and the shipbuilder (BAE Systems and the Aircraft Carrier Alliance).

The Aircraft: Too Few F-35Bs

The carriers are designed to operate the F-35B Lightning II, the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the US-built stealth fighter. The F-35B is one of the most advanced combat aircraft in the world, with:

• Stealth: Low radar cross-section makes it hard to detect and track
• Sensors: Advanced radar, infrared, and electronic warfare systems provide unmatched situational awareness
• Weapons: Can carry air-to-air missiles, precision-guided bombs, and anti-ship missiles
• Range: 900 nautical miles (1,670 km) combat radius

However, the UK has ordered only 48 F-35Bs (delivered by 2025), with an option for up to 90 more. This is a problem:

One Carrier Air Group, No Reserves

A typical carrier air group consists of:

• 24 F-35B fighters (two squadrons of 12)
• 14 helicopters (Merlin anti-submarine and Wildcat utility helicopters)

With only 48 F-35Bs, the Royal Navy can equip one carrier with 24 jets, leaving 24 for training, maintenance, and attrition reserves. This is a bare minimum—most navies aim for a 2:1 ratio of aircraft to deployed jets to allow for maintenance, upgrades, and losses.

The UK cannot deploy both carriers simultaneously with full air groups. If both carriers were operational, each would carry only 12 F-35Bs—too few to be effective.

No Plan to Buy More

The government has not committed to buying more F-35Bs beyond the initial 48. The 2021 Defence Command Paper stated the UK would "explore options" for additional aircraft but made no firm commitment. Each F-35B costs around £100 million (including development costs), so 90 aircraft would cost £9 billion—a sum the Ministry of Defence does not have.

Without more F-35Bs, the carriers will always be under-utilised, operating with smaller air groups than they were designed for.

The Manning Crisis: Not Enough Sailors

The Royal Navy has 33,000 personnel (as of January 2025), against a target of 35,000—a 6% shortfall. The shortage is particularly acute in critical specialisms:

• Marine engineers: Maintain and repair propulsion, electrical, and weapons systems
• Weapons engineers: Operate and maintain missiles, guns, and sensors
• Air engineers: Maintain and repair aircraft

The carriers require 1,600 personnel each (679 ship's company plus 915 air wing). With only 33,000 personnel total, the Royal Navy can crew one carrier plus a strike group (destroyers, frigates, submarines, support ships), but not two carriers simultaneously.

This is why the Royal Navy operates a "one in, one out" model: one carrier is operational while the other is in refit, maintenance, or reduced readiness. The Navy cannot surge both carriers in a crisis, unlike the US Navy, which can deploy multiple carriers simultaneously.

Why the Shortage?

The Royal Navy faces the same recruitment and retention problems as the Army:

• Uncompetitive pay: A newly qualified able seaman earns £23,496, below civilian equivalents
• Long deployments: Sailors spend 6-9 months at sea, away from family
• Poor accommodation: Many ships and shore bases have outdated, cramped accommodation
• Better opportunities elsewhere: Sailors with engineering, IT, or technical skills can earn more in civilian jobs

The Navy loses around 10% of personnel per year, and recruitment has not kept pace.

The Cost: £6.2 Billion to Build, £500 Million Per Year to Run

The two carriers cost £6.2 billion to build (£3.1 billion each), making them the most expensive defence programme in UK history apart from the Trident nuclear deterrent. The cost includes:

• Design and construction: £5.5 billion
• Initial equipment and systems: £700 million

The carriers cost around £500 million per year to operate and maintain (£250 million each), including:

• Fuel: Conventional propulsion requires regular refuelling (unlike nuclear-powered US carriers)
• Crew salaries and support: 1,600 personnel per carrier
• Maintenance and upgrades: Regular refits, repairs, and system upgrades
• Aircraft: F-35B operating costs (£30,000 per flight hour)

Over a 50-year service life, the total cost of the carriers (build plus operating costs) will be around £31 billion (£6.2 billion build + £25 billion operating costs). This is equivalent to:

• 40 Type 26 frigates (£8.2 billion for 8 ships = £1 billion each)
• 300 F-35B fighters (£100 million each)
• The entire annual defence budget for six months

The 2021 Indo-Pacific Deployment: Proof of Concept or Expensive PR?

In May 2021, HMS Queen Elizabeth led a carrier strike group on a seven-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific, the Royal Navy's most ambitious deployment since the Falklands War in 1982. The strike group included:

• HMS Queen Elizabeth (carrier)
• 2 Type 45 destroyers (HMS Defender, HMS Diamond)
• 2 Type 23 frigates (HMS Kent, HMS Richmond)
• 1 Astute-class submarine (HMS Artful)
• 2 support ships (RFA Fort Victoria, RFA Tidespring)
• 18 F-35Bs (8 RAF, 10 US Marine Corps)
• US Navy destroyer (USS The Sullivans)
• Dutch frigate (HNLMS Evertsen)

The deployment covered 26,000 nautical miles, visited 40 countries, and conducted exercises with the US, Japan, South Korea, India, and other partners. It was designed to demonstrate:

• Global reach: The UK can deploy a carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific and sustain it for months
• Interoperability: The UK can operate smoothly with US and allied forces
• Commitment: The UK is committed to security in the Indo-Pacific, not just Europe

The Successes

The deployment was operationally successful:

• No major mechanical failures: HMS Queen Elizabeth performed well, with no breakdowns
• Successful exercises: The strike group conducted live-fire exercises, anti-submarine warfare drills, and amphibious landings
• Diplomatic impact: The deployment was welcomed by Japan, South Korea, India, and other partners concerned about China's assertiveness

The Criticisms

Critics argued the deployment was expensive and exposed vulnerabilities:

• Cost: The deployment cost an estimated £250 million (fuel, supplies, maintenance, personnel)
• US dependence: 10 of the 18 F-35Bs were US Marine Corps aircraft, highlighting the UK's shortage of its own jets
• Escort shortage: The Royal Navy had to deploy 2 of its 6 Type 45 destroyers and 2 of its 13 Type 23 frigates, leaving few ships for other tasks (protecting home waters, supporting NATO)
• F-35 loss: One F-35B crashed into the Mediterranean in November 2021 (pilot ejected safely), a £100 million loss

The deployment proved the carriers can operate globally, but also highlighted the UK's limited resources.

The Strategic Debate: Are the Carriers Worth It?

The carriers are the most controversial element of UK defence policy, with fierce debate about whether they are worth the cost.

The Case For Carriers

Supporters argue carriers are essential for:

1. Power projection: Carriers allow the UK to operate globally without relying on foreign bases. Britain has few overseas bases (Cyprus, Gibraltar, Diego Garcia, the Falklands), so carriers provide mobile airfields that can deploy anywhere.

1. Deterrence: Carriers signal Britain's commitment to allies and deter adversaries. The 2021 Indo-Pacific deployment sent a message to China that the UK is willing to defend freedom of navigation and support partners.

1. Flexibility: Carriers can conduct a wide range of missions: air strikes, anti-submarine warfare, humanitarian relief, evacuations, and presence operations.

1. Prestige: Carriers are symbols of national power. Only a handful of countries operate large carriers (US, UK, China, France, India), and Britain's carriers reinforce its status as a major military power.

The Case Against Carriers

Critics argue carriers are:

1. Too expensive: £6.2 billion to build and £500 million per year to operate is unaffordable for a navy that lacks enough frigates, submarines, and personnel. The money could buy more useful capabilities (more Type 26 frigates, more F-35s, more submarines).

1. Vulnerable: Carriers are large, high-value targets. Modern anti-ship missiles (Russian Zircon, Chinese DF-21D "carrier killer") can strike from hundreds of miles away, and carriers require extensive escorts (destroyers, frigates, submarines) to protect them. In a war with China or Russia, carriers might be too vulnerable to deploy.

1. Under-utilised: The UK can only deploy one carrier at a time, and only with a reduced air group (18-24 F-35Bs instead of 40). The carriers are not being used to their full potential.

1. Wrong priority: The UK faces threats closer to home (Russia in the North Atlantic, terrorism in the Middle East) that do not require carriers. The money would be better spent on capabilities for high-intensity warfare in Europe (artillery, air defence, armoured vehicles).

International Comparisons: How Do UK Carriers Compare?

United States: The Supercarrier Fleet

The US Navy operates 11 supercarriers (10 Nimitz-class, 1 Ford-class), each:

• 100,000 tonnes (50% larger than UK carriers)
• Nuclear-powered (unlimited range, no need to refuel)
• 75-90 aircraft (double the UK's 40)
• CATOBAR (catapults and arrestor wires, allowing heavier, longer-range aircraft)
• 5,000+ crew (three times the UK's 1,600)

US carriers are in a different league. The UK carriers are impressive but cannot match US capability.

France: Charles de Gaulle

France operates one carrier, Charles de Gaulle:

• 42,000 tonnes (smaller than UK carriers)
• Nuclear-powered
• 40 aircraft (Rafale fighters and helicopters)
• CATOBAR (can launch heavier aircraft than UK carriers)

Charles de Gaulle is older (commissioned 2001) and smaller, but its nuclear propulsion and catapults give it advantages over UK carriers.

China: Growing Carrier Fleet

China operates three carriers (Liaoning, Shandong, Fujian) with more under construction:

• 60,000-80,000 tonnes
• Conventionally powered (Liaoning, Shandong); nuclear propulsion planned for future carriers
• 40-50 aircraft (J-15 fighters, similar to Russian Su-33)

China is rapidly building carrier capability and will likely surpass the UK in numbers and capability within a decade.

The Future: Can the UK Sustain Two Carriers?

The Royal Navy faces difficult choices:

Option 1: Maintain Both Carriers

This requires:

• More F-35Bs: At least 90 aircraft (£9 billion) to equip both carriers
• More personnel: Recruit and retain enough sailors to crew both carriers and their escorts
• More escorts: Build more Type 26 frigates and Type 45 destroyers to protect both carriers

This is the most expensive option and would require a significant increase in the defence budget.

Option 2: Operate One Carrier, Mothball the Other

The UK could operate one carrier (HMS Queen Elizabeth) and place the other (HMS Prince of Wales) in extended readiness (mothballed). This would:

• Save money: Around £250 million per year in operating costs
• Free up personnel: 1,600 sailors could be reassigned to other ships
• Maintain surge capability: The second carrier could be reactivated in a crisis (though this would take months)

This is politically difficult (admitting the UK cannot afford two carriers) but financially sensible.

Option 3: Sell or Lease One Carrier

The UK could sell or lease one carrier to an ally (India, Australia, or Japan have been mentioned as potential buyers). This would:

• Recover some cost: A carrier might sell for £2-3 billion
• Strengthen alliances: Leasing to an ally would deepen defence cooperation
• Reduce burden: The UK would only need to support one carrier

This is politically controversial (selling a flagship asset) but has been quietly discussed in defence circles.

The Bottom Line

HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales are the largest and most powerful warships ever built for Britain, costing £6.2 billion to build and £500 million per year to operate. They provide global reach and power projection, as demonstrated by the 2021 Indo-Pacific deployment. However, the Royal Navy has only 48 F-35Bs (enough for one carrier), manning shortages mean only one carrier can be operational at a time, and HMS Prince of Wales has suffered repeated mechanical failures. Critics argue the carriers are too expensive and absorb resources that could fund more frigates, submarines, or aircraft. Supporters counter that carriers are essential for global power projection and deterrence. The debate reflects a fundamental question: what kind of navy does Britain need, and can it afford the one it has built? Without more aircraft, more personnel, and more escorts, the carriers will remain under-utilised—impressive symbols of British power, but not fully effective military assets.